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Democracy is a relatively new thing in Brazil and still causes a certain degree of 
uneasiness in some sectors of society. In fact, markets, analysts, intellectuals, and even 
experienced politicians were surprised at the first measures taken by the PT 
administration. How should one interpret the apparent contradiction between the ideas 
advocated by the party for so many years and the proposals that it has put forward since 
it took office? 
 
Interpretations such as “co-optation in the power” or “political opportunism” seem to be 
more the result of political disappointment on the part of some individuals rather than a 
clear-headed analysis of the strategies that political parties are forced to pursue in order 
to survive in a highly competitive environment, one which is possibly more competitive 
than the most competitive of markets. Fortunately, Political Economy literature 
developed over the last 30 years is of great help in analyzing these kinds of decisions 
and results. The case that we will analyze in the following pages deals with the approval 
of economic reforms that demand more than just a simple majority vote in order to pass 
successfully through Congress and thus require that a special effort be made by the 
parties if the reforms in question are to be successfully approved.    
 
One of most interesting issues concerns the role of the opposition parties in the approval 
of reforms that are of the utmost importance to the growth of the country, and which 
were put forward by the executive body of government. As previously mentioned, on 
account of the fact that these reforms require changes to the country’s Constitution, a 
minimum 60% vote in favor is needed in Congress in order for the reform to be 
approved, thus giving opposition parties a degree of power totally out of proportion to 
their political representation. As a result, the opposition is capable of barring measures 
that are in the interest of the majority and often essential for the country’s growth. In 
this paper we attempt to analyze the opposition’s behavior using a model developed in 
the political economy tradition, which utilizes a sequential election game that results in 
distinct equilibriums, some involving cooperation, and some not, depending on the 
parties’ utilities.  
 
Two solutions available in Political Economy literature are of particular use in the case 
of this paper: the first one is the convergence solution, which indicates that in modern 
democracies the parties tend to converge upon platforms located at the median of 
voters’ preferences. This solution, which was put forward by Hotelling in 1929, was 
later developed by other authors such as Black in 1958 (see Alesina and Rosenthal 
(1995)). The key to this solution is the compensation that the parties get as a result of 
the election. It is the election-related motivation that leads parties to propose policies 
that meet the wishes of the majority of voters, with the result that democracy fulfills its 
social role of pushing society to increasingly higher levels of well being for its 
population. Therefore, in the context of our analysis, election-related interests neither 
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2 Banco Itaú - Brasil carry a pejorative meaning nor are construed as being morally questionable; on the 
contrary, they can become a force that defeats deeply in-rooted or corporate interests, 
therefore promoting the necessary changes... 
 
More recently, partial convergence was studied by Calvert in an article published in 
1985 and by Roemer in 1992 (see Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)). The key component 
in this solution is the preference of the parties. When parties have partisan interests 
other than that of electoral gain, convergence is merely partial; however, it is a long way 
off from the goals of some politicians who would like to see the demands of some 
groups at the extremes of society’s political spectrum being met. This already suggests 
that left-wing parties put forward policies that do not move too far from the desires of 
the average voter.  
 
The second important solution for our discussion deals with those papers that refer to 
the difficulties of implementing those reforms that are preferred by the majority. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), and Rodrick and Fernandez (1991) discuss the difficulties 
that arise from a lack of cooperation on the part of certain groups, either because they 
are directly affected or because they are unable to envisage any future benefits. In this 
paper, we deal with those voters who follow a very simple rule when choosing their 
candidate, though we also study the difficulties arising from the power of the 
opposition. 
 
As a result, we have an optimistic view of the Brazilian democratic process, in the sense 
that it will meet the demands of the majority of the population; however, the speed at 
which this will take place is slower than one would wish, since it follows the logic of 
the electoral cycle, which is always slower than that of the central planner. 
 




Let A and B
3 be two parties running for election and with distinct electoral platforms. 
Both parties put forward a proposition for reform X, on which the economy’s future 
GDP performance, Y, depends. There is a schedule of reforms on the agenda that must 
be approved in a given sequence. Following  Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), the parties 
have preference over their platforms, that is, 
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However, being in office gives them utility Û. If we assume θ is the relative weight 
given to the preference for reforms in the utility function, we can then express the utility 
of the parties during periods when they are in power by   
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and when they are in opposition by: 
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We assumed Û to be the same for both parties given the fact that we considered the 
utility to be the result of an institutional arrangement, such as for example the amount of 
television broadcast time, decisions concerning discretionary funds, or consolidation of 
reputation in the administrative area. Therefore, the increasing or decreasing of Û may 
become a policy tool. When a party wins the election, the promised reform is sent to 
Congress to be voted on and may or may not be approved, depending on the opposition 
parties. The winning party always sends the reform that it promised to carry out during 
the election campaign to Congress, since not doing so implies running the risk of being 
punished by being rejected at the next election. Therefore, any dynamic inconsistency is 
ruled out. The party chooses to run for election on the platform that has brought it the 
highest level of utility throughout its existence; thus, it may present itself with a 
platform that may not be the best one in terms of meeting its party objective, but one 
instead that ensures that its election-related objectives will be attained. And this means 





Each voter belongs to one of the following groups: A if it benefits from reform XA; B if 
it benefits from reform XB; and I if it is indifferent to either of the aforementioned 
reforms. Choosing a candidate should be as follows: 
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Voters will vote for the party that puts forward reforms from which they will benefit. In 
the case of those voters who will not be affected by the reforms, their votes are 
contingent on the performance of the economy. Thus, if the party is successful in getting 
a certain reform passed, which benefits a substantial number of voters, it should, as a 
result, obtain a good performance in terms of product Y, and voters who are indifferent 
to the reform will vote for the party that is currently in office, guaranteeing its re-
election. On the other hand, if the party does not manage to get the reform approved, 
voters who are not affected by it vote for the opposition party, giving it a chance to win 
the elections. As a result, the larger the number of voters that benefit from the reform, 
the better the party’s performance in the election. Voters’ preferences are only revealed 
at the polls; therefore, ex-ante, each party believes that it has a 50% probability of 
winning the elections.  
 
Therefore, if the party in office manages to get the reform approved, it is re-elected. Its 
permanence in power for another term of office, however, depends on the new platform 




  2Party A puts forward the platform of reforms XA; Party B puts forward the platform of 
reforms XB and A wins the election. In order to make notation simple, let us assume that 
XB is the status quo and that the percentage of voters who will benefit from the reform 
is greater than the percentage of indifferent voters, which in turn is greater than the 
percentage of voters for XB. We also assume that neither group holds more than 50% of 
the votes. Since we are interested in those reforms that demand a vote of at least 60% in 
Congress, we shall look at the case in which the opposition party has enough votes to 
prevent the reform from going through. 
 
Each party has life time utility and the future is discounted at a rate of δ. The game 
starts again from scratch once the reform is approved; therefore, each party estimates 
the present value of its utility post-reform, taking into consideration that it has a 50% 
chance of returning to power and a 50% chance of becoming the opposition.  
 
Actions by B as an opposition party, in the first period. 
 
Party B can choose from among 3 actions: 
 
1. Approving the reforms, allowing A to be re-elected and then trying again to get 
elected in the next period with a new platform. 
In this case, B’s utility is 
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The first term represents the utility in the first period, when the party is in opposition 
and helps to get the reform approved; the second term represents the future present 
value of the utility in connection with the parties’ preferences, given that XA was 
approved (the sum of the periods it is in power and the periods it is in opposition); and 
the last term represents the expected present value of the utility in connection with being 
in power. 
 
and A’s utility is 
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The first two terms indicate the utility associated with being in power and the last two 
terms are similar to those of B. 
 
2. Not approving the reform and trying once again to run on its platform. In this case, 
since the preferences have already been revealed and the party is aware that it can only 
count on the votes of minorities and discontented voters, B does not get elected, but at 
the same time does not allow A to impose its platform. If B chooses to follow this 
strategy, it has to stick to it on a permanent basis. Indeed, given that δ > 0, if it intends 
to adopt a different strategy in the future, it would be advisable to do so immediately. 
  3Thus, we can assume that B will run on platform XB in all future elections and A will 
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3. Not approving the reform and run with A’s
4 platform. In this case, it will be able to 
count on the votes of part of the majority who would benefit from the reform as well as 
the votes of those voters who are discontented with the performance of party A, and 
thus gets elected
5. Its utility depends, in this case, on A’s course of action.  
 
A’s actions in the second period, when it is in opposition, given that B was elected 
on the platform of reforms XA
 
A can choose from two courses of action (the third one, which consists of running on 
B’s platform does not make sense, since it neither represents its preference nor will it 
bring the party victory at the polls). 
 
3.1 Approving the reforms proposed by B, allowing B to be re-elected and then standing 
for election in the next period on a new platform. 
In this case, B’s utility is: 
(5) 
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and A’s utility: 
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3.2. Not approving the reform. In this case, A wins the next election but once again 
depends on B to get the reform approved and remain in power. If B is consistent in its 
behavior, it should behave in exactly the same way as it did in the first round, i.e., refuse 
to approve the reform with a view to run on A’s platform so as to get elected, and then 
depend on A to get the reform approved. However, if A also shows consistency in its 
behavior, it will not approve the reform and so on. This is the case in which the reform 
never gets approved and A and B take turns in power. 
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which can be rewritten as: 
 












and A’s utility: 
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which can be rewritten as:
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If both parties behave in a consistent manner, A will approve reform XA, proposed by B, 
if: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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Since both terms of this inequality are positive, party A tends to approve the reform in 
the following cases: 
i) the greater θ is, increasing the weigh given to the partisan component and reducing 
the weight of the election-related interest component.  
ii) the greater its partisan preference is affected by the reform, in such a way that 
UA(XA)>>UA(XB). 
iii) the lower δ (the intertemporal preference rate) is. The intuition for this result follows 
naturally: if it approves the reform, A’s satisfaction with the partisan component is 
assured, since it is the party’s very own platform that is being approved; its satisfaction 
in terms of the election-related interest component, which only appears when it is in 
power, will only occur at some point in the future. 
 
  5It is easy to prove that B’s behavior over time will be consistent, that is, if it chose not 
to approve the reform, it must continue to do so forever. Note that if B has to get the 
reform approved, it will always choose to postpone doing so for yet another period, 
since not approving the reforms satisfies its partisan preference and the party then takes 
turns in power, thus satisfying every other period its election-related interest, whereas 
by choosing to approve the reforms does not satisfy its partisan preference and it will 
have a 50% chance of staying in power, though always under the new mechanism 
imposed by the reform.  
 
We may now turn to B’s strategy in the first period - when it is in the opposition – 
which consists of choosing between the reform put forward by party A, or not 
approving it and then running for election on its own platform XB or between approving 
XA or not approving it and trying to run on A’s platform, XA. 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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It is easy to see that B should approve the reform proposed by A when: 
i) θ is low, i.e., when the election-related interest component is high and the partisan 
component is low. 
ii) δ is high, for the same reasons as given in the case for A. 
iii) the disutility in connection with approving XA is very high when compared to the 
status quo. 
To put it differently, the more committed the party is to its platform, the more effort it 
will make to stop the reforms. 
 
The other strategy B could pursue in the first period is to choose between approving XA 
and not approving it, running at the next election on A’s platform. In this case, we have 
two possible outcomes: 
If A, when it is in opposition in the second period approves XA, then B approves XA in 
the first period if: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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Since the first term in equation (11) is negative, if B believes that A will approve its 
own platform when it is in opposition in the second period, it will never approve the 
reform A is proposing in the first period. 
 
If A, when it is in opposition in the second period, does not approve XA, then B will 
approve XA in the first period if: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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Given that the first term is negative and the second one positive, since δ+δ
2 ≤ 2, B, in 
the first period will never approve XA if it believes that A, in opposition in the second 
period, will not approve the reform either. Therefore, if B plans to stand for election at a 
later date on A’s platform, it will never approve the reform proposed by A in the first 
period, while B is in opposition.  
Therefore, irrespective of whatever step A may take when it is in opposition in the 
second period, B will never approve XA if it plans to stand for election in the second 
period on A’s platform. 
 
All that remains to be done is to check what conditions must be in place for B to prefer 
to stand for election in the next period on its own platform, XB rather than on A’s 
platform, XA. Once again, we are faced with 2 cases: Whether or not B believes that A, 
when it is in opposition, will approve the reform.  
 
In order for B to choose to run for election on its own platform XB rather than XA, when 
A is in opposition and does not approve XA it is necessary that: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
 









Since the second term is positive, in the case of A not approving XA, B will never run 
on its own platform, and will opt to run for election on platform XA. The logic of this 
result follows naturally: it meets B’s partisan goal in both cases, since it will not have to 
live with A’s platform, that will never get approved. Conversely, it has the chance of 
gaining power every other period, which gives it utility in terms of the election-related 
interest component. 
 
  7If A approves the reform, B will choose to run on its platform if: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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B prefers to run on its platform, sacrificing future elections, the greater its partisan 
component is and the higher the level of its intertemporal preference rate is. 
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The partisan component in B has to be greater in order for B to choose XB over XA, 
rather than not approve the reform put forward by A. Therefore, if B prefers XB to XA, it 
will never approve the reform. 
 
Summing up: 
1. If B, as an opposition party, approves the reform proposed by A, A gets re-elected 
and the game is over. 
2. If B, when it is in opposition, does not approve the reform proposed by A and decides 
to run on its own platform, A gets re-elected because B’s platform only has minority 
support. If B behaves in a consistent fashion and insists on sticking to its platform in 
future elections, it will always be defeated, but at the same time it will not allow A’s 
platform to be implemented. 
3. If B, when it is in opposition, does not approve the reform proposed by A, but at the 
next election decides to run with platform XA, it gets elected. Party A, now in 
opposition, approves the reform proposed by B if its partisan component is higher than 
its election-related interest component. Otherwise, it does not. 
5. If B intends to run on platform XB, it may or may not approve the reform proposed by 
A. It will approve it if it is a party that is concerned with winning the election and it will 
not approve it if it is more of a partisan party. 
6. If B intends to stand for election on platform XA it will never approve XA while it is 
in opposition (independent of whatever A may do). 
  87. B prefers to run on platform XA rather than XB if it believes that A does not approve 
XA; however, in this case we know that it will never approve reform XA during the first 
period. 
8. If B’s partisan objective is extremely strong, the party may prefer to stand for election 
on XB rather than XA if it believes that A will approve XA when it is in opposition. But 





Thus, we have the following equilibrium situations: 
 
1. If B exhibits a strong partisan component it will prefer to run on XB rather than on 
XA. But the necessary condition for this to happen is such that B, when it is in 
opposition, will not approve the platform put forward by A. In this case the reform will 
never get approved and the opposition party will always remain in opposition.   
 
2. If B shows a strong enough election-related interest component, it will prefer to stand 
for election on XA rather than on XB. In this case, irrespective of whatever A may do 
when it is in opposition in the second period, B will never approve the reform in the first 
period. Since B will get elected in the second period, if A has a high enough partisan 
component that it will approve the reform when it is in opposition, B will get re-elected 
and A and B will once again run against each other at the next elections, on other reform 
platforms.  
 
3. The same situation as in the previous item with respect to B, but A also shows a high 
election-related interest component, such that it does not approve the reform when it is 
in opposition. In this case, the parties would take turn in power and the reform will 
never get approved. Notice that there is no cooperative equilibrium situation in which B 
will approve the reform proposed by A. This is because B gets more utility from the 
status quo when it is in opposition than A does, since A benefits from the approval of 
reforms it originally proposed. 
 
Changes in Û have an ambiguous effect to the extent that it has an equal impact on both 
parties. A reduction in Û, for instance, may cause B to wish to remain in opposition, 
never approving the reform. If the reduction is not sufficient for B to not approve the 
reform but it chooses to stand for election on A’s platform, in these circumstances A 
will show a greater propensity to approving the reforms.  
 
A significant change in the results of the model is seen when approximately the same 
number of voters benefit from each of the platforms, and the victory of one of the 
candidates is determined by the votes of indifferent voters dissatisfied with the previous 
administration. In this case it is easy to see that the opposition will never approve the 
reforms proposed by the party in power, so that the latter never manages to achieve a 
good performance. Therefore, indifferent voters will always vote for the opposition 
party, which runs on its own platform of reforms. In such a situation, the reforms will 
never be approved and the parties will take turns in power.  
 
 
  9 
III Costs associated with Postponing the Reform 
 
So far we have not included any penalties associated with the parties not approving 
reforms that benefit the majority of the voters. A simplified way of introducing this 
penalty would be to assume that as long as the reform is not approved, the economy’s 
total output falls at a rate of φ<1. Therefore, the longer it takes to get the reform 
approved, the worse the economic conditions that the opposition party will eventually 
inherit. On the other hand, the worse the economic situation, the harder it is to govern 
and therefore, the lower the utility obtained when in power. Thus, delaying approval of 
a given reform entails some penalties for the party that intends to be the next in power.  
 
 
The utility function of the party in power becomes: 
 
                                            Û
  with       )) ( ˆ )( 1 ( ) (
1 − =
= = − +
Y





and when it is in opposition, the utility function remains unchanged: 
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Obviously, everyone loses from a lower level of output, whether or not they are in 
power. However, our objective here is to emphasize that the utility of the party is 
affected by the constraints associated with governing an economy in recession; 
therefore, the level of output is only considered in Û. 
 
Once again, A wins the election by proposing platform XA, which has to be approved by 
Congress. B, as the opposition, has the power to determine whether or not the reform is 
approved. Party B may: 
 
1.  Approve the reform.  
 
In this case, the utilities of A and B remain unchanged. (1) and (2) are still valid, only Û 
is replaced by Y. 
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2. Not approve the reform and run on its own platform, XB. 
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3.  Not approve the reform and run on A’s platform. 
 
In this case, B’s choice will once again depend on A’s course of action. 
 
3.1 If A approves the reform its utility remains unchanged from in (6), with just Û being 
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and if it does not approve the reforms: 
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Thus A approves the reform in the second period if: 
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Since the term in brackets on the right side of (22) is negative, A always approves the 
reform if B did not approve it in the first period.  
 
We may now turn back to B. Its utility - when it does not approve the reform, given that 
A approves it, remains unchanged. Thus, since A always approves the reform in the 
second period, B does not approve it in the first period. Therefore, in an instance in 
which not approving the reform leads to a gradual reduction in the gain in terms of 
election-related interests, the equilibrium represented by taking turns in power without 
approving the reform ceases to exist. This outcome is similar to that of the bargain 






We analyzed a game in which political parties, with partisan and electoral interests, try 
to approve reforms that benefit the majority of population but face an opposition with 
substantial power that may determine the fate of the reforms. Its behavior may lead to 
different equilibrium situations. 
 
  11(i)  Approval of the reform after an election cycle, where the parties that were 
initially against the reform end up making it their own. 
(ii)  Not approving the reform, with the parties taking turn in power. 
(iii)  Not approving the reform, with the party that originally proposed the reform 
remaining in power. 
 
Taking into consideration the costs associated with postponing the reform, we can only 
eliminate the equilibrium (ii) of turns in power if the reform is not approved. The reform 
is only approved after an election cycle, when the party that proposed it is now in 
opposition. If the party that was at first against the reform is overly ideological, the 
reform will never be passed even if the country’s economic situation continues to 
deteriorate. In this case, a possible public policy might be to increase the compensation 
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